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ascribed to robots so that the question of their ethical  impact remains unanswered. Leaving 
the  individualistic account behind in favor of a relational approach,  it can be derived from a 








2　Robots as individual agents






















mon  ethical  accounts  can  be  regarded  as  “good  old  fashioned  ethics”  in  the  case  of  robotic 
agents. Standard ethical accounts come as universalistic accounts which ascribe moral agency 















































The  third property of moral agency,  responsiveness,  refers  to  the ability  to be held re-
sponsible for one’s actions. Considering robots as autonomous agents, the question arises who 





possibly result  in sanctions. Thus,  if an agent  is capable of  these reflections and  judgments, 
the agent fulfills one more criterion of moral agency.







2.2　Robotic architecture and moral agency





















and  robotic  agency,  and  exemplify  some  difficulties  of  “moral  programming”.  The  cognitive 



























humans  can  rely  on  a  complex body  of  experience  and  common  sense knowledge,  artificial 
agents do not have those resources. This problem can be clarified by a simple situation: People 
meet in a room of a private house, converse and have snacks. If a human, e.g. the child of the 








2.2.2　Moral program codes in top-down architectures
The frame problem regarding “moral programming” is caused by so-called top-down archi-
tectures.(6) Also  labeled as deliberative or cognitivist,  these architectures build on  the sense-
think-act scheme: First, the robot senses the world through its sensors and adds this informa-
tion  to  its  world  model  given  by  the  programmer.  Here,  “world”  depends  on  the  sensory 





























2.  “A  robot must  obey  the orders given  it by human beings except where  such orders 
would conflict with the First Law.”




problem raised by Asimov’s  laws consists  in the assessment of a given situation  in order to 
determine the degree of acceptable risk  for humans  (cf.  law 1). But even  from a  legal view-
























agency cannot be ascribed and  their ethical  impact  remains a problem  in  individualistic ap-
proaches.(8)

























tonomous  skills.  Accordingly,  autonomy  relies  on  world-coupling  between  the  robotic  agent 




plified by  subjective  computing  (Grüneberg & Suzuki,  2014). Experiments  in  socially guided 
machine  learning  showed  that  a  robotic  agent  develops  its  autonomous  skills  by  means  of 
feedback of  a human  trainer. These  experiments build  on  robotic  agents  that  are  equipped 
with a specific ability and that can control their respective ability autonomously. In one case, 
an  agent  came  as  a  robotic  arm  whose  task  consists  in  balancing  an  inverted  pendulum 
(Grüneberg & Suzuki, 2014, pp. 10–11). The agent can control various degrees of  freedom of 
the arm so  that  it  is—in principle—capable of balancing  the pendulum. However,  the agent 
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3.3　Robots in socio-technical systems: pinning down moral responsibility to legal liability
Following  the cognitive analysis  of  autonomy and  the dependency of  robotic  on human 
agents, the former ones are cognitively relevant only in  interaction scenarios with the latter 





Contrary  to  the  definition  of  robot  ethics  by Veruggio,  all  these  senses  have  to  be  ad-
dressed  simultaneously  as  they  concern  the  fundamental  issue  of  “how moral  responsibility 




reciprocal  interrelationship  between  humans  and machines”  (Ropohl,  1999). Thus,  robots  ap-
pear in their specific contexts of their cultural implementation. Even if robots do not meet the 
conditions for moral agency,  it  is nevertheless possible to explain their ethical  impact: robots 
matter ethically because their autonomous behavior develops during interaction with human 
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overcome the  limitations of  individualistic moral status ascription.  Instead of  formulating ab-
stract criteria for moral reasoning or responsiveness which in turn serve to clarify who is re-
sponsible  as  a  moral  agent  (while  it  remains  problematic  to  decide  about  the  exact  conse-




ducers, managers,  overseers, policy makers and users.  In  this view,  the  robot  is never held 
responsible as an AMA(9), but seen as an extension of human action.(10)
Summarizing the results of the cognitive analysis of robotic autonomy and their agency in 
socio-technical systems,  it can be said that the ethical  impact of robots  involves the cultural 















robots  as  these means  are more  appropriate  ones  to  reach  the  goal  of  correct  functioning.  In  this 
view,  the general moral  issue of guilt  (as a consequence of violating responsibility)  and subsequent 
punishment  shifts  to  a  rather  concrete  problem  of  technical  modification  which  involves  the  men-
tioned actors in the socio-technial system.
(10)     Following this view, procedures of  technology assessment can be applied to specify technological, 
economical, legal, ethical and psychological issues of robotic usage (Decker, 2012) (Decker, 2014).
（ 128 ）（ 129 ） The Cultural Impact on Ethics: Robotic Agency in Socio-Technical Systems 31 
legal judgment).
4　Context-dependency and ethical assessment
The results of  the cognitive analysis of  robotic behavior and related problems of moral 
status ascription will finally be exemplified by a concrete robotic application.


















The developers  specify  three  types of desired effects:  “psychological,  such as  relaxation 
and motivation, physiological, such as improvement in vital signs, and social effects such as in-
stigating communication among patients and caregivers.”(13) Research in Japan as well as in the 
U.S.  and  several European  countries  suggests  that  these  effects have  indeed been  achieved 
(Kazuyoshi Wada, Shibata, Saito, Sakamoto, & Tanie, 2005) (K. Wada, Shibata, Musha, & Kimu-
ra, 2008) (Shibata & Wada, 2011) (Klein, 2011). For the purpose of studying the psychological, 







ed  video  recording  and  physiological  tests  such  as  urine  samples.  Regarding  psychological 
well-being, Paro made patients  laugh, attenuated feelings of  loneliness and increased feelings 





isolation  behind  and  engage  in  group  activity  (Klein,  2011).  There  have  also  been  reported 
some  problems  with  patients  who  fixated  on  an  individual  relation  with  Paro  and  cases  of 
non-interest  (Klein,  2011).  However,  the  overall  implementation  of  Paro  suggests  significant 
positive effects for the elderly resident’s of nursing homes and consequently a relief of stress 
for the care personnel.

















































moral  agents. Thus,  the gap between  the  failed ascription of moral  agency  to  robots  in  the 
standard  approach  and  their  factual  ethical  impact  can  be  overcome  by  conceiving  robotic 
agents as parts of socio-technical systems. However, it must be noted that moral theory is not 
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